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Abstract This paper surveys the literature on the implications of trade liberali-
sation for intra-national economic geographies. Three results stand out. First, neither
urban systems models nor new economic geography models imply a robust pre-
diction for the impact of trade openness on spatial concentration. Whether trade
promotes concentration or dispersion depends on subtle modelling choices among
which it is impossible to adjudicate a priori. Second, empirical evidence mirrors the
theoretical indeterminacy: a majority of cross-country studies find no significant
effect of openness on urban concentration or regional inequality. Third, the avail-
able models predict that, other things equal, regions with inherently less costly
access to foreign markets, such as border or port regions, stand to reap the largest
gains from trade liberalisation. This prediction is confirmed by the available evi-
dence. Whether trade liberalisation raises or lowers regional inequality therefore
depends on each country’s specific geography.
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1 Introduction
Trade economists have long studied what happens within countries when trade
barriers are removed between countries. By far the most attention has been paid to
the sectoral dimension of this problem. Theories of comparative advantage are all
about how the market reallocates resources across industries and production factors
to reap the gains from international specialisation. More recently, the focus has
shifted from sectors to firms, with theories of intra-industry trade and heterogeneous
firms shedding light on how trade affects distributions of firm types within
countries.
I focus on a third dimension of within-country adjustment to trade: space. The
importance of this issue is well understood by policy makers. An oft-heard fear
related to trade liberalisation is that it could accentuate intra-national inequalities
not only across industries and occupational groups but also across regions. Take the
following quote from the 2009 World Development Report:
‘‘The openness to trade and capital flows that makes markets more global also
makes subnational disparities in income larger and persist for longer in today’s
developing countries. Not all parts of a country are suited for accessing world
markets, and coastal and economically dense places do better. China’s GDP
per capita in 2007 was he same as that of Britain in 1911. Shanghai, China’s
leading area, today has a GDP per capita the same as Britain in 1988, while
lagging Guizhou is closer to Britain in 1930. China’s size, the openness of
coastal China to world trade, and Shanghai’s location are the reasons (World
Bank 2008, p. 12)’’.
This quote is representative of mainstream economic thinking in so far as it
makes two central assertions: that trade liberalisation increases within-country
spatial inequality, and that it favours regions with better access to international trade
routes. My aim is to test these two common claims against the insights from the
relevant scientific literature.
Policy makers cannot ignore the spatial implications of international trade, if
indeed they turn out to be a general corollary of open markets. In the European
Union, for instance, redistributive regional policies have formed part and parcel of
the post-war integration project since its very inception. While in reality these
policies may chiefly be the result of political horse-trading, their intellectual
underpinning is invariably provided by the claim that integration may harm
‘‘peripheral’’ or ‘‘disadvantaged’’ areas. Is this is a valid intellectual case? If it were,
i.e. if trade systematically favoured regional divergence within countries, then
accompanying regional policies such as those adopted in Europe might fruitfully be
considered elsewhere too.
The last two decades have seen a resurgence of research interest in economic
geography, and significant advances have been made in terms of scientific rigour
and data availability. This is therefore a propitious moment to take stock of what
this research teaches us about the effects of trade liberalisation on intra-national
economic geographies. This survey covers both theoretical and empirical analyses,
in an attempt to give as comprehensive as possible an overview of the current state
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of the relevant economic research. ‘‘Trade liberalisation’’ is understood primarily as
the opening of cross-border goods markets through policy changes or technological
improvements, but I also consider some papers that explore the effects of liberalised
cross-border investment flows.1
The paper has a simple structure. Section 2 summarises relevant theoretical
work, and Sect. 3 presents corresponding empirical evidence. Section 4 concludes.
2 Theory
Even though the spatial dimension of intra-national trade adjustment has attracted a
fraction of the attention that international economists have dedicated to the sector
and firm dimensions, the existing literature does offer a number of useful models
that lend structure and rigour to the analysis of the regional question. The theoretical
exercise undertaken in these papers is simple: they track what happens to the
allocation economic activity across different regions within a country as trade with
the rest of the world becomes less costly. This thought experiment abstracts from
simultaneous changes in intra-national trade costs by assuming that within-country
trade costs do not change, and that they are either zero or significantly lower than
between-country trade costs.
This literature essentially consists of two generations of models: a somewhat
older ‘‘urban systems’’ approach, based on perfectly competitive perfectly markets
with exogenous region-level scale economies, and the more recent ‘‘new economic
geography’’ (NEG) approach, which allows for monopolistically competitive
markets and endogenises regional scale economies. Another distinction is between
models that assume locations within countries to be ex ante identical, and models
that assume these locations to differ in some inherent characteristics. I subdivide
this section chronologically, treating the second distinction within each generation
of models.
2.1 Urban systems
2.1.1 Uniform intra-national space
It took a long time for trade theory to incorporate the intra-national spatial
dimension. To the best of my knowledge, the first general-equilibrium model of
external trade and internal geography is due to Henderson (1982). This paper has
pioneered the analysis of city distributions in (small) open economies.
Based on his seminal model of urban systems (Henderson 1974), Henderson
(1982) develops a model of city size distributions in the neoclassical tradition: firms
produce with constant returns to scale, goods are homogeneous, and goods and
workers are perfectly mobile within a country. The distinctive twist of this model
1 This survey is of a qualitative nature, as a formal meta analysis would not yet be appropriate in view of
the limited number and methodological heterogeneity of available empirical studies (see Tables 1, 2 in
Sect. 3).
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relative to standard neoclassical trade theories is that city-level scale economies
exist. These scale economies are external to individual firms, allowing perfect
competition to prevail. They are modelled on the supply side as Hicks-neutral
sector-specific productivity advantages of larger industrial clusters. Offsetting this
productivity advantage is a demand-side congestion parameter, capturing the
(assumed) inconveniences of big-city life.2 An additional dispersion force comes
from the assumption that cities are monocentric, and that larger cities therefore
spend more of their workers’ resources on commuting. Apart from their size, cities
differ in terms of their relative use of labour and capital in production, and therefore
in terms of their sectoral specialisation. In equilibrium, every city is perfectly
specialised in the production of one traded good as well as non-traded ‘‘housing’’.3
Abstraction is made of differences in endowments and amenities, and yet cities of
different sizes and sectoral specialisations coexist in equilibrium. Equilibrium city
sizes increase with the degree of scale economies, with the capital intensity of
production and with the overall size of the industry in which a city is specialised.
Henderson’s (1982) main result is to show that the fundamental theorems of
neoclassical trade theory hold equally in his urban-systems model, assuming a small
open economy. What does this imply for the research question that motivates this
survey? Three implications can be highlighted:
– Since the model assumes that all workers are perfectly mobile, equilibrium real
wages (expressed in utility terms) are always equalised across cities. Interna-
tional trade liberalisation, even though it will affect the distribution of city sizes,
will have no regional distributive effects in welfare terms.
– Import restrictions increase the number of cities that are specialised in the
protected industries. Protectionism therefore has spatial effects. If import
barriers are applied to big-city industries, protectionism raises urban
concentration.
– The Heckscher–Ohlin and Rybczynski theorems imply that trade liberalisation
will increase the number of cities that are specialised in a capital-intensive good
if the country as a whole is relatively capital abundant, and of cities that are
specialised in a labour-intensive good if the country as a whole is relatively
labour abundant. Since capital-intensive cities are larger in Henderson’s model,
this implies that trade liberalisation will lead to a shift from smaller to larger
cities in capital-abundant countries, and from larger to smaller cities in labour-
abundant countries. Therefore, the effect of trade on urban concentration
depends on countries’ relative factor endowments.
In a similar model featuring industries with firm-level increasing returns, Rauch
(1989) finds that countries with lower commuting costs (i.e. cheaper means of
sustaining large cities) will have a comparative advantage in increasing-returns
industries (which operate most efficiently in large cities). The intuitive implication
2 Henderson (1987) does away with demand-side congestion and, by choosing a specific a functional
form for the supply-side scale-economy term, arrives at the same results with regard to trade openness as
Henderson (1982).
3 Cities being perfectly specialised implies that city-level increasing returns can be thought of in this
model as own-sector ‘‘localisation economies’’.
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is that trade liberalisation will lead to urban concentration in countries where large
cities are cheaper to sustain—be it due to conductive topography, to weaker
planning restrictions or to the efficiency of local public services.
2.1.2 Heterogeneous intra-national space
Models of international trade that represent intra-national geography as intrinsically
featureless miss one key element of reality: within a given country, some places
enjoy better access to international markets than others. The larger a country and the
more diverse it is in terms of topography and infrastructure, the more such
differential market access will matter. In the words of Henderson (1996, p. 33), ‘‘the
impact of trade is situation-specific, depending on the precise geography of the
country’’.
This aspect was first modelled formally by Rauch (1991). He develops a multi-
sector Ricardian trade model with an internal geography consisting of monocentric
cities as in Henderson (1974, 1982).4 He adds a twist by imposing a specific
structure on this internal geography. Internal trade costs are assumed to exist (in
iceberg form), and cities are located in a straight line (a ‘‘river’’) that is
perpendicular to the country’s border (the ‘‘coast’’). Hence, a natural ranking arises
among potential urban sites in terms of their access to foreign markets, with cities
located close to the coast facing lower international trade costs than interior cities.
In autarky, i.e. with prohibitively high external trade costs, the location of cities
is without consequence, and all cities are of equal size in equilibrium. At
intermediate trade costs, some cities near the border partly specialise and engage in
international trade, while other cities further inland remain autarkic. The trading
cities will then be monotonically bigger the closer they are located to the coast,
while the interior non-trading cities will be equally sized. If international trade costs
are low enough (but internal trade costs remain unchanged), even the most inland
city will specialise and engage in international trade, and city sizes will decrease
monotonically with distance from the coast for all cities.
The implication of the Rauch (1991) model is straightforward: external trade
liberalisation with unchanged intra-national trade costs will favour the growth of
cities close to the coast (or border) and, absent any other geographical features,
bring about a monotonic city-size gradient as one moves inland. Hence, trade
opening is associated with increasing urban concentration, and with a shift of
population towards cities with better access to foreign markets.
Note that this gradient concerns city sizes only; since workers are assumed to be
fully mobile across cities, real wages are equalised across cities, and the issue of
spatial inequality again does not arise. This invariance of real wages is common to
all pre-NEG general-equilibrium models. Hence, taken literally, the trade-induced
spatial effects in pre-NEG models are of interest only to map makers but not policy
4 One difference to Henderson’s model is that Rauch (1991) assumes agglomeration externalities to arise
on the demand side, through consumers deriving pleasure from interacting with each other while working
or shopping in the city centre. As these externalities are not specific to individual sectors, they can be
considered a form of urbanisation economies.
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makers, as the changing internal geographies in these models are not associated with
any welfare-relevant spatial inequalities.
2.2 New economic geography
2.2.1 Uniform intra-national space
Building on the seminal paper by Krugman (1991), Krugman and Livas Elizondo
(1996) were first to study regional adjustment to international trade liberalisation in
a NEG model. Unlike the urban-systems models following Henderson (1974),
where the number and size of cities is endogenous, the NEG framework
exogenously partitions countries into regions.5 In the Krugman and Livas Elizondo
(1996) model, there are two such regions, one factor of production and one industry,
consisting of horizontally differentiated goods. Their model remains close to
Henderson’s framework in so far as it represents regions as monocentric cities,
where the need to commute acts as a monotonically increasingly cost of city size.
The main difference is that external economies are now micro-founded: because of
a taste for variety and interregional iceberg transport costs, consumers like to locate
close to as large a number of producers as possible (‘‘forward linkages’’); and in
order to save on transport and fixed set-up costs, monopolistically competitive
producers seek to locate their single plant as close to their consumers as possible
(‘‘backward linkages’’).
To this two-region domestic economy, Krugman and Livas Elizondo (1996) add
a third region, the ‘‘rest of the world’’. The two domestic regions are identical in
every respect, including access to the rest of the world. In this sense, this is a model
of uniform intra-national space.6
The model lends itself to the comparative static examination of trade
liberalisation: the trade cost between the two domestic regions and the rest of the
world is gradually lowered, while the internal trade cost remains unchanged at a
comparatively low level. While the model cannot be solved analytically, simula-
tions produce a stark picture: if parameters are such that autarkic economies are
spatially concentrated, then trade liberalisation favours the internal dispersion of
activities. The mechanism underlying this result is as follows. At high external trade
costs, imports and exports are relatively unimportant to the location choices of firms
and consumers, and domestic backward and forward linkages fully come into play.
This favours agglomeration in one of the two domestic regions. At low external
trade costs, however, a large share of goods are bought from and sold to abroad.
Given the assumed equality of both regions’ access to the foreign market, firms and
consumers are indifferent between the two domestic regions with respect to
internationally traded goods. Hence, as trade openness increases, the weight of
domestic backward and forward linkages is reduced. The strength of congestion
5 On the differences between neoclassical urban systems models and NEG models, see Henderson
(1996).
6 Alonso Villar (2001) simulates the Krugman and Livas Elizondo (1996) model for a two-region home
country and two symmetric one-region foreign countries (1 ? 2 ? 1) and obtains qualitatively the same
result: trade liberalisation favours internal dispersion.
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costs, however, is modelled in a way that makes it independent of the external trade
costs. Hence there can be a threshold of trade openness beyond which the
congestion force comes to dominate the backward and forward linkages, and
population will evenly disperse among the two regions.7 Krugman and Livas
Elizondo (1996, 137) frame their model in a developing-country context and
interpret it rather forcefully, by concluding that ‘‘the giant Third World metropolis
is an unintended by-product of import-substitution policies, and will tend to shrink
as developing countries liberalise’’.
An alternative version of the same story is provided by the model of Behrens
et al. (2007). In this model too, external trade liberalisation favours internal
dispersion. The framework within which this effect is found, however, differs from
that of Krugman and Livas Elizondo (1996). Behrens et al. (2007) use the model of
monopolistic competition due to Ottaviano et al. (2002), which can be solved
analytically and allows for welfare analysis. They look at a world consisting of two
identical countries, each containing two symmetric regions. Instead of the urban
congestion costs assumed by Krugman and Livas Elizondo (1996), their model
contains two other dispersion forces. One dispersion force arises from the
assumption that some workers (‘‘farmers’’) are immobile across regions. This is
the dispersion force of the original Krugman (1991) model. In addition, the
Ottaviano et al. (2002) model features markups that fall in the intensity of local
competition. This ‘‘competition effect’’ in regions with high firm concentrations acts
as another dispersion force. The resulting pattern in the Behrens et al. (2007) model,
mirrors that of Krugman and Livas Elizondo (1996): external trade liberalisation,
with unchanged internal transport costs, favours internal dispersion.8 Since
dispersion is associated in this model with higher welfare, the centrifugal impact
of trade liberalisation on internal economic geographies turns out to be desirable.
Interestingly, a number of apparently very similar models arrive at exactly the
reverse result, whereby trade liberalisation fosters intra-national agglomeration
rather than dispersion. These models are in fact closer to the original Krugman
(1991) NEG model than both Krugman and Livas Elizondo (1996) and Behrens
et al. (2007), as they do not introduce urban congestion costs and they rely on the
original Dixit–Stiglitz representation of preferences. The first papers in that line of
research were Monfort and Nicolini (2000) and Monfort and van Ypersele (2003),
analysing trade integration between two two-region countries (2 ? 2), and Paluzie
(2001), looking at a two-region country liberalising with respect to a one-region
‘‘rest of the world’’ (2 ? 1). Their simulation results tell a consistent story: external
liberalisation fosters internal agglomeration.
7 There also exists an interval at intermediate levels of the external trade cost for which both dispersion
and concentration are locally stable equilibria.
8 Another interesting result in Behrens et al. (2007) is that the spatial allocation of mobile activities
within a country is not affected by that same spatial allocation in the other country. In that sense, internal
geographies are mutually independent. However, in that same model, one country’s internal geography
matters for the other country’s welfare (through price effects). Moreover, in a closely related paper
(Behrens et al. 2006), the same authors show that if international trade costs fall more than proportionally
with trade volumes, internal economic geographies become interdependent.
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Another exercise in the same vein is the analysis of Fujita et al. (1999, chap. 18).
They add a sectoral dimension to the Krugman–Livas Elizondo (1996) model.
Assuming the existence of sector-level agglomeration forces (from input–output
linkages) but no sector-level dispersion forces, they find that trade liberalisation
triggers geographic concentration of individual sectors. Further comparable
simulation analyses are reported by Bru¨lhart et al. (2004) and by Crozet and
Koenig (2004) for a 2 ? 1 world.9 Both papers also find that external trade
liberalisation triggers internal spatial concentration when domestic regions are
identical ex ante.
Whence the difference between the two types of model? As is typical of NEG
frameworks, all models predict that the intensity of agglomeration forces falls with
trade liberalisation. The question then is what happens to dispersion forces.10 In the
seminal paper by Krugman (1991), the intensity of the dispersion force implied by
the demand of spatially immobile ‘‘farmers’’ falls even faster than the that of the
agglomeration force, implying that trade liberalisation, once it exceeds some
threshold value, induces agglomeration.11 This mechanism drives the results of
Monfort and Nicolini (2000) and Paluzie (2001). In order to reverse these results,
the earlier papers had to assume stronger dispersion forces, either in the form of
exogenous urban congestion costs (Krugman and Livas Elizondo 1996) or in the
form of lower markups in denser regions (Behrens et al. 2007).
Which type of model is better? Both approaches rely on specific functional
forms, and no a priori reasoning will be able to adjudicate between the two. The
only viable solution would appear to be empirical. If the data were to point to
external liberalisation systematically triggering internal dispersion, then the models
with strong dispersion forces would appear as better representations of reality.
Otherwise, the models with weaker dispersion forces would seem more useful.
2.2.2 Heterogeneous intra-national space
One step towards greater realism is to allow for inherently different regions, the key
consideration being that some places offer cheaper access to foreign markets than
others.
This issue was first explicitly considered within a NEG framework by Alonso
Villar (1999), who applied the model of Krugman and Livas Elizondo (1996) to a
9 The former paper is based on the Pflu¨ger (2004) variant of the NEG model, which can be solved
analytically and features smooth changes in spatial configurations rather than the discrete ‘‘catastrophes’’
inherent in the Krugman (1991) model, while the latter considers the original Krugman (1991)
framework. This difference in modelling approaches turns out to have no effect on the qualitative
predictions.
10 The key difference between the papers discussed in this section concerns assumptions on dispersion
forces. However, other elements of the model can be manipulated as well. For instance, Mansori (2003)
assumes that there are region-specific fixed costs to international trade. This implies an additional
agglomeration force, since with increasing importance of external trade, the price of access to foreign
markets become relatively more important, which favours concentration in a single region. This can be
thought of as the endogenous formation of a port region. Mansori (2003) finds that this assumption too
can reverse the Krugman and Livas Elizondo (1996) result.
11 See Baldwin et al. (2003, chap. 2) for an discussion of this mechanism.
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1 ? 3 ? 1 world, composed of two symmetric single-region outside countries and a
home country consisting of three regions. The model’s assumed structure of trade
costs is as if the five countries/regions were placed on a line. Hence, of the three
domestic regions, two border one of the two identical foreign countries; and one is
the interior region, with equally costly access to both foreign markets. Alonso Villar
(1999) finds that for large enough outside countries and non-prohibitive interna-
tional trade costs, agglomeration of mobile activity in the interior region cannot be
an equilibrium. Instead, one or both border regions become host to all mobile
activity. This model thus suggests that border regions have a locational advantage in
open economies.
Alonso Villar (1999) does not explicitly trace what happens to domestic spatial
equilibria as external trade costs are gradually lowered. This is done in Bru¨lhart
et al. (2004) and Crozet and Koenig (2004), for a 2 ? 1 world. They find two
particular features of the asymmetric model compared to the version with uniform
intra-national space. First, as foreign demand weakens the domestic agglomeration
force, an additional effect appears, because domestic firms now have an incentive to
locate in the region closest to the foreign market. One of the potential effects of
trade liberalisation is thus to attract domestic firms towards the border, where they
can reap the full benefit of improved access to foreign demand. Second, as foreign
supply weakens the domestic dispersion force, the interior region allows firms to
locate away from the foreign competitors. Hence, trade liberalisation may attract
domestic firms towards the interior region, where they are relatively sheltered from
foreign competition. The analysis shows that if the interior region hosts the locus of
agglomeration prior to trade liberalisation, mobile activity may not relocate towards
the border region even if trade becomes free. A relocation towards the border region
becomes more probable (a) the larger is the share of mobile activity in the border
region prior to liberalisation, (b) the stronger is the degree of liberalisation, (c) the
larger is the size of the foreign market, and (d) the more complementary is
the sectoral composition of the foreign market (such that the demand pull towards
the border is strong, and the competition effect is weak).
Finally, real-world regions differ in more respects than access to foreign markets.
Unequal factor endowments are an evident dimension to consider. Haaparanta
(1998) does just that, by studying a two-country two-region model (2 ? 2) where,
within each country, each region is uniquely endowed with one of two specific
production factors, such that each traded good is produced only by one type of
region. Other than that, the model is standard NEG. Trade liberalisation in this
model leads to spatial concentration in the region that produces the good for which
the country as a whole enjoys a comparative advantage. Hence, quite intuitively, if
industries are exogenously tied to certain regions, specialisation in comparative-
advantage industries will lead to spatial concentration in the regions that host these
industries, and this process can be reinforced by agglomeration economies.
The broad implications of NEG models closely resemble those of the pre-NEG
literature: whether trade liberalisation favours overall intra-national concentration or
dispersion depends on possibly quite subtle, in general equally tenable, modelling
choices; whereas the tendency for trade liberalisation to favour re-location towards
border regions emerges as an almost ubiquitous result. The two approaches do,
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however, differ in terms of the implied distributive, effects. In neoclassical models,
real wages are equalised across regions, and changes in the geography of production
are therefore not associated with regional inequality. This is also true for interior
equilibria in NEG models, where mobile activity does not fully agglomerate in one
place and real wages therefore equate across regions. In the fully agglomerated
equilibria, however, the residents of the region that hosts the agglomeration enjoy
higher real wages than the (immobile) residents of the depleted ‘‘periphery’’. Hence,
trade liberalisation has the potential to make regions with better access to foreign
markets better off while implying a net reduction in welfare for the (immobile
residents of the) remaining regions.
The impact of trade liberalisation on overall national welfare also appears in a
different light in NEG compared to neoclassical approaches. The three theoretical
studies that consider this issue explicitly all conclude that, with agglomeration
effects, trade liberalisation can be welfare reducing (Haaparanta 1998; Mansori
2003; Behrens et al. 2007). The three models differ in many respects, but all of them
feature market equilibria with excess agglomeration. In other words, all three
models imply a rationale for regional policy counteracting agglomeration tendencies
as trade is liberalised. However, one would not do justice to this literature to read
such a simple policy prescription into it. Trade-induced welfare-reducing agglom-
eration is an interesting but special case, and welfare-improving trade liberalisation
remains possible in all these models.12
3 Empirical evidence
Similar to the distinction in theory between models that do not consider intra-
national regional heterogeneity and models that do, one can categorise empirical
studies into those that explore the determinants of summary measures of within-
country spatial concentration and those that study specific geographic reallocations
within individual countries. This chapter is therefore subdivided according to
whether statistical identification is derived from between-country variation or from
within-country variation.13
3.1 Cross-country regressions
Table 1 presents a chronological summary of studies that in one way or another
regress some measure of within-country spatial concentration on a set of
explanatory variables that includes a measure of trade openness. The differences
in data coverage, definition of variables, regression specification and estimation
technique are large—too large in fact for a formal meta-analysis. A majority of
12 In addition, these models are static in nature. As shown by Bertinelli and Black (2004), agglomerations
that appear excessively large in a static sense may in fact be optimal dynamically, if growth is knowledge-
driven and knowledge is generated in agglomerations.
13 I consider only studies that use regression techniques to identify the spatial effects of openness.
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studies use data on the shape of city-size distributions as the measure of spatial
concentration.
Column (9) of Table 1 brings out a remarkably consistent and perhaps surprising
regularity: ten out of the eleven studies find that trade openness either has no
statistically significant effect on within-country concentration, or that it is associated
with spatial convergence. The available evidence therefore cannot be said to support
the view that trade liberalisation systematically fosters within-country regional
divergence—in fact the opposite view would seem to get rather stronger support.
I shall not discuss each of the eleven papers covered by Table 1, but focus on
four of them that are of particular relevance. First, the outlier: the study by Egger
et al. (2005) is unique in associating trade openness with spatial divergence. Their
dependent variable is the variance of regional real wages within countries. Thus,
theirs is the only study of Table 1 that employs a measure of differentials in factor
prices (wages) rather than factor quantities (population) as the dependent variable.
Taken at face value, this could be interpreted as suggesting that trade induces
significant within-country divergence in real wages without corresponding labour
movements. It is also possible, however, that they pick up a specificity of Central
and Eastern European transition countries in the 1990s. The size of their sample (42
observations) also suggests that some caution should be applied in inferring general
conclusions.
The most cited of the papers covered by Table 1 is Ades and Glaeser (1995).
They were first to run large cross-country regressions seeking to explain
determinants of urban primacy, defined as the population share of a country’s
largest city. The negative and statistically significant effect of openness found in
simple OLS regressions turns insignificant once they take account of the possibility
of reverse causality by instrumenting the openness variable. They therefore
conclude that the ‘‘hypothesis that urban concentration is negatively related to
international trade is borne out in the data. […] However, [the] instrumental-
variables results cast doubt on the causality in these correlations’’ (p. 224).
Nitsch (2006) updates the Ades–Glaeser study with a larger country sample. His
data are longitudinal, allowing him to include country fixed effects and thereby to
purge the regression model of potential country-specific omitted variable bias. He
finds no statistically significant effect of various openness measures on urban
primacy in any of his panel regressions. Similarly, Bru¨lhart and Sbergami (2008),
drawing on an even larger cross-country data set, find that the interaction of
openness and urban concentration is never statistically significant in dynamic panel
growth regressions. This implies that the (on average positive) impact of
urbanisation on economic growth is independent of openness, as is the (on average
negative) impact of urban primacy. It conversely also implies that the (on average
positive) impact of openness on economic growth is independent of urban
concentration. Hence, it does not seem that more open countries benefit less or
suffer more from concentrated urban geographies than less open countries do.
The standard empirical specification is a regression of some measure of
geographic concentration, typically urban primacy, and a set of explanatory
variables that includes trade openness. Henderson (2000) proposes a simple but
interesting extension of this design, by including an interaction term between trade
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openness and a dummy that is equal to one if the country’s largest city has a sea
port. While the effects he estimates are quantitatively rather modest, he does find
statistically significant evidence that, overall, openness reduces urban primacy, but
that, if the largest city is a port, openness increases primacy.14 This finding suggests
that, in empirics just as in theory, an assessment of the intra-national spatial effect of
trade liberalisation needs to account for the heterogeneity of intra-national space. I
now turn to studies which do just that.
3.2 Within-country regressions
Except for Henderson (2000), between-country econometric studies do not control
for different intra-national geographies. There exists, however, a growing literature
that focuses on heterogeneous regional responses to trade liberalisation within a
given country. A summary of this literature is provided in Table 2.
Just as in Table 1, column (9) of Table 2 is an attempt at summarising the key
result of each paper by attributing it to one of three categories: trade openness
favours spatial convergence, it favours spatial divergence, or it has no discernible
effect. Only one of the papers covered in Table 1 fell into the ‘‘spatial divergence’’
category. The picture is much more mixed in the case of within-country studies.
Table 2, column (9), shows that seven of the 14 papers associate trade opening with
spatial divergence, whereas three papers diagnose spatial convergence.
Why this difference? One reason is that one country, Mexico, has attracted by far
the most scientific research on this issue. Seven of the 14 papers covered in Table 2
are based on Mexican data. Mexico indeed represents an interesting case, given its
historic inward-orientation followed by rapid trade liberalisation from the mid-
1980s onwards. The Mexican papers that allow a categorisation by ‘‘verdict’’
(Table 2, column 9) all point towards spatial divergence in the wake of trade
liberalisation. The two original studies by Hanson (1997, 1998) hold the key to this
result: trade liberalisation led to a shift of activity towards the Mexican border with
the United States. Since these border regions were already relatively richer and
more industrialised than the Mexican average prior to the opening of trade (see
Hanson 1998), the boost they received from trade liberalisation implied an increase
in measured nationwide regional inequality.15
Essentially the same story has been documented for a number of Asian countries.
In China, trade appears to have disproportionately favoured the already-richer
coastal regions (Kanbur and Zhang 2005). Henderson and Kuncoro (1996) report
that the Indonesian trade liberalisation of 1983 was associated with a stronger
14 In a survey of the literature, Duranton (2008) nevertheless concludes that the empirical support for
trade-based explanations of urban primacy remains weaker than evidence pointing towards political and
institutional factors that shape primacy.
15 Faber (2007) confirms that employment in export-oriented industries grew more strongly in Mexican
border regions, but suggests that import-competing industries grew more strongly in interior regions.
While this result turns out not to be robust to the timing of the trade variable, it does point towards trade
liberalisation changing not only the spatial distribution of aggregate activity but also the sectoral
composition of regions. Hanson (2001) furthermore documents how export-led growth of Mexican border
towns promoted economic growth of adjacent US border towns, thus providing further evidence of the
economic advantages enjoyed by border regions under trade liberalization.
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concentration of private sector firms in the main metropolitan areas of Java.16 In the
Philippines, trade liberalisation appears to have benefited primarily the Manila area
(Pernia and Quising 2003).
There is one exception to this general result. Sanguinetti and Volpe Martincus
(2009) observe that employment in Argentine manufacturing sectors that were
subject to larger tariff reductions in the 1985–1994 period tended to grow
disproportionately in regions far away from the historical heart of manufacturing
activity in and around Buenos Aires (which also happens to be the country’s main
ocean port). No significant effect is found for distance from Sao Paulo, which
suggests that the observed dispersion away from the Argentine capital was not due
to relocation close to regions bordering Brazil or Uruguay. These results certainly
suggest that caution be applied in generalising the within-country effects from trade
liberalisation; and the Argentine experience might merit further analysis, if possible
spanning a longer time period and instrumenting for industry-level tariff changes.17
Moreover, if the best access to the foreign markets happens to be enjoyed by
previously lagging regions, then the available evidence suggests that trade openness
favours spatial convergence. One example is West Germany, whose border cities
with East Germany experienced significantly slower population growth during the
post-war period of German division, suggesting that the suppression of trade with
Eastern Europe implied divergence of population trends across West German cities
(Redding and Sturm 2008) A similar example is provided by Austria, whose
previously relatively disadvantaged eastern border regions experienced significant
boosts to both wages and employment subsequent to the fall of the Iron Curtain in
1990 (Bru¨lhart et al. 2010).
In sum, and at the risk of some over-generalisation, the story implied by the
within-country studies of regional adjustment to trade liberalisation is quite simple.
Regions with better access to foreign markets benefit. If, previous to trade
liberalisation, these were lagging regions, then liberalisation entails spatial
convergence. If, however, the regions with the best access to foreign markets have
been the most advanced regions already prior to trade liberalisation, then the
opening of trade will bring about spatial divergence.18
16 Consistent with Henderson and Kuncoro’s (1996) results, Sjo¨berg and Sjo¨holm (2004) calculate that
Indonesian firms engaged in international trade are more spatially concentrated than non-trading firms,
and that the spatial concentration of trading firms grew more strongly over the 1980–1996 period than that
of non-trading firms.
17 One conceivable reverse-causality story is that industries concentrated around the capital city were
more successful in lobbying against tariff cuts. The fact that Volpe (2010) finds a different result for
Brazil, where trade liberalisation in the 1990s appears to have been associated with a significant shift of
industry towards the Argentine border, makes the findings for Argentina stand out even more.
18 This effect does not seem to be confined to modern-day manufacturing trade. Atsumi (2011) reports
how, subsequent to an abrupt opening to international trade by Japan in 1859, population shifted towards
eastern Japan (with the new export gateway Tokyo) from western Japan (with the old capital Kyoto), and
that this coincided with the west–east relocation of the main export industry (silk fabrics).
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3.3 The European experience
This survey would not be complete without consideration of the debate on the
regional effects of European integration. Empirical research documents that EU
integration over the last half-century has been associated with convergence across
countries and divergence within countries (e.g. Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006;
Rodriguez-Pose and Gill 2006; Melchior 2008b). This is mirrored to some extent
by trends in spatial concentration of individual sectors, for which Bru¨lhart and
Traeger (2005), using decompositions of entropy indices, document an increase in
the share of within-country concentration in the 1990s. Bru¨lhart (2001) shows that
industries that were strongly affected by the liberalisation measures under the
EU’s Single Market programme saw a particularly pronounced increase in spatial
concentration after the launch of this programme in the early 1990s—liberalization
thus appears to have favoured sectoral clustering. In Central and Eastern European
countries, transition to market-based systems and integration into the EU have
been accompanied by increasing regional inequalities, due mainly to further
economic concentration of service sectors (Bru¨lhart 2006) in capital cities
(Melchior 2009), from an already very high level of urban primacy (Bru¨lhart and
Koenig 2006).
The parallel evolution of EU integration and intra-national spatial inequalities
certainly suggests that market opening is no overwhelming force for regional
convergence, but it should probably not be interpreted as causal evidence that trade
in fact promotes regional divergence. Too many changes, both political and
technological, have been occurring simultaneously with the deepening and widening
of the EU’s Single Market for researchers to attribute everything to this policy
project. Solid causal evidence on the spatial effect of European integration remains
elusive.
An interesting approach to this challenge is been taken by Melchior (2008a). He
sets up a one-factor-one-sector monopolistic competition model over a map of nine
countries and 90 regions in a grid pattern that resembles the geography of Europe.
Changes in trade costs affect the relative market access of regions and therefore the
wages they can afford to pay in equilibrium. This allows for the simulation of a
number of liberalisation scenarios. The general pattern that emerges is that, other
things equal, regions close to the frontier along which trade costs are reduced benefit
more in terms of real-wage growth than regions far from that frontier. This again
could imply convergence or divergence, depending on whether the border regions
start from a lower or higher base than the interior regions. An exception to this
pattern is found for scenarios where some interior region has ‘‘hub’’ status, in the
sense that it enjoys lower trade costs to foreign markets than the geographically
closer border regions. In that case, trade liberalisation tends to raise real wages in
the hub region and increase inequality in the concerned country. Melchior’s (2008a)
simulations thus neatly encompass the main regularities found in the relevant
theoretical and empirical literatures to date.
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4 Conclusions
This paper surveys the literature on the implications of trade liberalisation for intra-
national economic geographies. Three results stand out.
First, when regions are assumed to be symmetric, then neither urban systems
models nor new economic geography models imply a robust prediction on the
impact of trade openness on regional inequality. Whether trade promotes
convergence or divergence depends on subtle modelling choices among which it
is impossible to adjudicate a priori. The variety of theoretical predictions in fact
shows that the question whether trade promotes intra-national spatial convergence
or divergence is posed in overly general terms.
Second, empirical evidence mirrors the theoretical indeterminacy: a majority of
cross-country studies find no significant effect of openness on urban concentration
or overall regional inequality. The claim made in the passage of 2009 World
Development Report cited in the Introduction, whereby openness ‘‘makes subna-
tional disparities in income larger’’ (World Bank 2008, p. 12), therefore appears too
strong and general in light of the existing scientific literature.
Third, the available models predict that, other things equal, regions with
inherently less costly access to foreign markets, such as border or port regions, stand
to reap the largest gains from trade liberalisation. This prediction is confirmed by
the available evidence. Whether trade liberalisation raises or lowers regional
inequality depends on each country’s specific geography. The authors of the 2009
World Development Report therefore stand on firmer ground when proposing that
‘‘(n)ot all parts of a country are suited for accessing world markets, and coastal and
economically dense places do better’’ (World Bank 2008, p. 12).
Intra-national geography is only partly shaped by nature. Port locations and
navigable rivers are evident examples of natural features that facilitate access to
distant markets. In modern economies, however, market access is shaped to an ever
larger extent by man-made infrastructure, including roads, railway links, airports
and telecommunication networks, as well as by the efficiency with which these
networks are operated and by institutional factors affecting trade. The finding that
regions with better access to foreign markets tend to reap the biggest gains from
foreign trade logically implies that governments that seek to spread the gains from
trade equally across their territories should seek to enhance the access of all
domestic regions to foreign markets by removing market inefficiencies in the
provision of internal transport and communication services and by investing in
transport and telecommunications networks.19
This overview of the current literature points towards some potentially fruitful
directions for future research. On the theoretical side, it could be useful to model the
differential impacts of reductions in trade costs that are independent of distance
(such as multilateral tariff cuts) and reductions in trade costs that are proportional to
distance (such as falling transport costs). The relative importance of different
19 An important caveat to this conclusion is that, with regional differences in dimensions other than
market access, improved intra-national trade infrastructure can have a dampening effect on economic
activity in the less productive regions (Martin and Rogers 1995).
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regions’ intra-national accessibility could in some instances depend on the nature of
external trade liberalisation. For empirical work, there surely exists further scope for
attempting explicitly causal estimation of the impact of trade on intra-national
economic geographies, either through instrumentation or by exploiting quasi-
experimental settings. Another promising avenue will be to refine the question and
to search for differential spatial effects of openness in terms of wages and of
employment, possibly at the industry level, and for interactions of such effects with
exogenous features of geography, with endogenous agglomeration economies and
with public policies.
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